DOI: 10.32725/978-80-7394-976-1.32

Short sequence iterated prisoner’s dilemma in simulations and applications

Tereza Čapková, Tomáš Roskovec

University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Faculty of Economics, Department of applied mathematics and informatics, Studentská 13, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic, capkot00@ef.jcu.cz.

University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Faculty of Economics, Department of applied mathematics and informatics, Studentská 13, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic, troskovec@jcu.cz.

We focus on the model of iterated prisoner’s dilemma, by this we mean the game of two players deciding in prisoner’s dilemma repeatedly and deciding based on the knowledge of previous decisions of their co-player. In the classical one-round model, it is suggested that players should and will tend not to cooperate. But when the game is repeated, players may build trust by collaborating and profit out of this cooperation in the game with many rounds. Several models suggest that building up trust is the winning strategy and that players using it would profit. However, as the strategy for one round and the model for many rounds do not coincide, we focus on the breaking point where the choice of strategy is not clear.

Klíčová slova: Prisoner’s dilemma, non-zero-sum game, coopetition, iterated prisoner’s dilemma, game theory, evolution of cooperation

stránky: 215-221