DOI: 10.32725/978-80-7394-976-1.32

Short sequence iterated prisoner’s dilemma in simulations and applications

Tereza Čapková, Tomáš Roskovec
University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Faculty of Economics, Department of applied mathematics and informatics, Studentská 13, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic, capkot00@ef.jcu.cz.
University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Faculty of Economics, Department of applied mathematics and informatics, Studentská 13, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic, troskovec@jcu.cz.


We focus on the model of iterated prisoner’s dilemma, by this we mean the game of two players deciding in prisoner’s dilemma repeatedly and deciding based on the knowledge of previous decisions of their co-player. In the classical one-round model, it is suggested that players should and will tend not to cooperate. But when the game is repeated, players may build trust by collaborating and profit out of this cooperation in the game with many rounds. Several models suggest that building up trust is the winning strategy and that players using it would profit. However, as the strategy for one round and the model for many rounds do not coincide, we focus on the breaking point where the choice of strategy is not clear.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma, non-zero-sum game, coopetition, iterated prisoner’s dilemma, game theory, evolution of cooperation

pages: 215-221



References

  1. Aumann, R. .., & Hart, S. (1992). Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. North-Holland.
  2. Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25. DOI:10.1177/002200278002400101 Go to original source...
  3. Axelrod, R. (1990). The Evolution of Co-operation. Penguin Books Ltd.
  4. Case, N. (n.d.). The Evolution of trust. Retrieved from https://ncase.me/
  5. Corts, K. S. (1998). Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment. The RAND Journal of Economics, 29(2), 306-323. Go to original source...
  6. Covey, S. R. (1989). The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change. Free Press.
  7. Dymáková, S. (Director). (2013). Šmejdi [Motion Picture].
  8. Fogel, D. B. (1993). Evolving Behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 77-97. Go to original source...
  9. Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
  10. Kraines, D., & Kranes, V. (1989). Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma. Theory and Decision, 26(1), 47-79. Go to original source...
  11. Kučera, D., & Müllerová, J. (2017). The Value Orientation of the Czech Companies in the Frame of Sustainable Corporate Responsibility. In Innovation Management, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability (IMES 2017) (496-504). Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze.
  12. Morgenstern, O., & Neumann, J. v. (1947). The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  13. Nash, J. (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. The Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286-295. Go to original source...
  14. Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2016). Trust. Our World in Data. Retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/trust
  15. Thaler, R. H. (2016). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. Norton.
  16. Yao, X., & Darwen, P. J. (1994). An experimental study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Progress in Evolutionary Computation, 90-108. Go to original source...
Return